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Kant and Rawls on Rights and International Relations 
ABSTRACT 
The Kantian doctrine of rights is a conception of equality of human beings which in a sense is 
pre-moral, and expressed in the concept of a person. For Kant, “Recht” is that free action whose 
maxim can coexist with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law. A distinguishing 
feature of the Kantian doctrine of rights is that rights are correlative to coercible duties.  To 
determine if it is possible for Kant’s ethical position to provide an adequate theory of right, a 
thorough critical examination of his position and its consequences will be engaged.  This will 
involve showing how Kant derives each part of his theory from the former in order to put forth a 
coherent doctrine of rights that can be extended to international realms. The thesis is laid out as 
follows. The first two chapters present the development of the Kantian system of rights. 
Subsequently, chapter three discusses the Kantian principles of justice being put into practice, 
and shows his derivation of the right of nations. The latter part of chapter three discusses the 
Kantian account of justice beyond borders, to regulate relations between societies both 
domestically and internationally. Lastly, chapter four presents the Rawlsian system of rights, and 
of develops a framework for international relations while highlighting its pitfalls.  An attempt is 
made to show that Kant’s notion of right is defensible as it offers a greater degree of moral 
authority and political potency as a framework for international relations grounded in the 
unrestricted workings of practical reason and is superior to Rawls’ attempt to construct such a 
framework as it relies on abstract hypothetical conditions. Within the Kantian system, it is the 
workings of practical reason that allows rational persons to recognize the need to resurrect  
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institutions that protect equality and autonomy universally. When reason is not fully subjected to 
public, it runs the risk of forwarding improper ideas that may ultimately undermine the freedom 
of others.  However, within the Rawlsian system, subjects of justice are merely capable of acting 
autonomously, rather than acting autonomously for the sake of justice in itself.  
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PREFACE 
 Many writers have relied upon a Kantian basis for their system of rights. Kant provides 
an intellectual bedrock upon which the notion of rights and justice can be understood. The main 
subject of this thesis is what Kant calls “Recht”, and how it is related to the concept of rights and 
natural law.  Within this thesis, an attempt has been made to outline the central themes within the 
Kantian system of rights. Kant determines the set of rights a person has by means of the criterion 
for right actions (categorical imperative). The categorical imperative determines the rightness of 
acts by whether you could let everyone do the same. The first formulation of the categorical 
imperative states “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law" (Metaphysics of Morals, 230).   That is, each individual agent 
regards itself as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way that everyone will always act 
according to the same general rule in the future. The second formulation of the categorical 
imperative states, “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Metaphysics of 
Morals, 230). Finally, the third formulation of the categorical imperative combines the first two 
formulations and is as follows, “All maxims as proceeding from our own [hypothetical] making 
of law ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends” (Metaphysics of Morals, 230). 
Thus, this formulation states that morality consists of doing one’s duty to treat people, including 
yourself, as an end, never only as a means to an end. To treat other people as an end is to respect 
people as rational moral agents who also have their own goals, projects and other life pursuits; to 
recognize their humanity.   
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Through the course of this discussion, only, the first formulation of the categorical imperative 
will be consistently employed. Kant maintained that this expression of moral law provides a 
concrete, practical method for evaluating human actions of distinct varieties.  
 
 Following this, I go onto examine how Kant derives each part within his system of rights 
from the former, and how the Kantian system is mutually consistent within the various parts of 
the system.   The various fundamental blocks of the Kantian system are critically examined: The 
Concept of Agreement, The Concept of an End, The Innate Right of Humanity, The Universal 
Principle of Rights and The Idea of Giving Laws to Ourselves. Lastly, the Kantian framework 
for international relations is presented alongside an account of John Rawls’ theory of justice and 
his framework for international relations.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I have relied on various translations that best capture all of 
Kant’s political writings relevant to flush out his notion of right and his framework for 
international relations. The aim of this thesis is to draw readers’ attention to the continued 
relevance of Kant’s notion of right as a framework for international relations is defensible as it 
offers a greater degree of moral authority as a framework for international relations grounded in 
the unrestricted workings of practical reason and is superior to Rawls’ attempt to construct such 
a framework on abstract hypothetical conditions.  
In spite of similar objectives, Rawls’ duty of assistance based on the value of toleration 
fails to do justice to any core liberal values, and simply comes off as an account lacking moral 
authority. Whereas Kantian cosmopolitan distributive theory serves as a morally rich account, as  
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Kant grounds political duties within the unrestricted workings of practical reason. Kantian 
account possesses moral authority as it grounds political duties within the unrestricted workings 
of practical reason. It is due to practical reason; rational persons recognize the need to resurrect 
institutions that protect equality and autonomy universally. When reason is not fully subjected to 
public, it can forward improper ideas that may undermine the freedom of others.  In the absence 
of such a universal principle of right, there are no constraints imposed upon the external freedom 
of finite rational creatures situated in inescapable proximity to others. Ultimately, it is practical 
reason that enables persons to recognize the need to resurrect institutions that protect equality 
and autonomy universally. Only by means of practical reason it would follow that all individuals 
would have the means to attain their respective ends to realize their freedoms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Kant’s treatment of rights produces a non-teleological constitutive structure within which 
it is possible for claims of rights to be possible.  According to Kant, we can compare the kind of 
interpersonal relations involved in claims about rights to moral rules only if these rules are 
formal and function as part of an a priori structure. In the state of nature, human beings must 
already be related to one another through interpersonal laws. There must be a legal context which 
contains a priori rules to properly understand and resolve conflicts concerning rights when they 
arise.  
So what does Kant mean by the term, “Recht”? And how does this relate to the concept 
of rights and natural law? Kant draws some important distinctions. At least three senses of the 
term are at play in The Metaphysics of Morals, between “Recht,” “das Recht,” and “ein Recht”. 
Kant writes in ‘‘The Doctrine of Right’’ 
“Recht” (iustum) is that free action whose maxim can coexist with the freedom of 
everyone according to a universal law.—“Das Recht” (scientia) is the system of 
law according to which what is “Recht” or “Unrecht” is determined. “Ein Recht” 
(of which someone can have several) is a capacity of the will to bind others 
rightfully.” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 262)  
 The term “Recht” for Kant takes on two characterizations. On one hand, “it refers to 
actions that a person may perform because they can coexist with the freedom of others according 
to a universal law” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 262). But, “Recht” also refers to rights to 
specific objects (property and contractual obligations). In this sense, “Recht” means the capacity 
to obligate another with regard to some object of one’s will. By means of these two 
characterizations, Kant is drawing a distinction between innate and acquired rights.  Lastly, 
“Recht” also refers to the systematic totality of laws used to determine the previous 
characterizations.  
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 The central feature found within the concept of a right is the capacity to obligate others. 
This essentially means that all rights are correlative to duties which persons can be compelled to 
perform. Within, The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant speaks to the association of “Recht” with the 
obligation and title to coerce: 
“The possessor of [a moral right] is conceived as having a moral justification for 
limiting the freedom of another...simply because in the circumstances a certain 
distribution of human freedom will be maintained if he by his choice is allowed to 
determine how that other shall act” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 237).  
For instance, in the case of murder, everyone has a claim-right that no one can be murdered. 
Murder is considered as not only a crime against a particular individual but against the whole 
community. Kant regards rights as including the title to coerce, which means that when a person 
exercises a power to obligate another, he may also through rightful means use force to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligation (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 232). The very title to coerce 
allows individuals to control an area of life (freedom) such that he is able to live as an individual 
responsible only to himself. And further, due to the title to coerce, one person need not depend 
on the arbitrary will (conscience of another) for the performance of a duty.  
A fundamental feature of right for Kant, as shown above, is that rights are correlative to 
coercible duties. Kant’s conception of right refers to a corresponding obligation.  Thus, the 
bearer of the right can rightfully (through relevant legal means) compel performance of the 
correlative duty.  In the “Doctrine of Rights,” Kant writes: 
“We know our freedom ...from which all moral laws and therefore, also, all rights as well 
as duties proceed ...only through the moral imperative which is a proposition 
commanding duties” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 231)  
 
Kant maintains that a person has a right to something if, and only if, someone else has a 
corresponding moral duty, which would be right for others to compel him to perform. In order to 
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determine which rights a person has, it is necessary to determine such duties. Kant establishes 
what rights persons have by the criterion for right actions (categorical imperative). The 
categorical imperative determines the rightness of acts by whether you could let everyone do the 
same. The categorical imperative states, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 
230). The other formulations of the categorical imperative include, “Act in such a way that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an 
end, never merely as a means” and “All maxims as proceeding from our own [hypothetical] 
making of law ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends” (Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, 230).  Each individual agent regards itself as determining, by its decision to act in a 
certain way that everyone will always act according to the same general rule in the future. Kant 
maintained that this expression of moral law provides a concrete, practical method for evaluating 
human actions of distinct varieties. Using the criterion of rightness of actions, we determine 
those wrong actions which it would be right to coerce others to refrain from engaging. From this, 
we further deduce those duties to which rights correspond. In order to determine duties 
corresponding to rights, Kant provides a test which may also be used to rights. The test goes as 
follows: “A person has a right to something if and only if, his having it or doing it is a condition 
under which the will of one person can be united together with the will of another in accordance 
with a universal law of freedom” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 230). Kant’s aim is not only 
to provide an analysis of what a theory of right ought to look like, but also provide an account of 
why it is morally right for persons to relate to one another through rights. The categorical 
imperative allows persons to determine the rightness of actions, allowing the realization of the 
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notion of rights for all persons.  For the purposes of this thesis, the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative will be consistently applied throughout the discussion. 
Within the present thesis, I attempt to determine if the Kantian ethical position provides 
an adequate theory of rights. For a theory of rights to be considered adequate, it needs to 
establish a core set of individual rights (movement, speech, pursuit of happiness). It must also 
permit discussion on the matters of distributive justice (how benefits are to be rightfully 
distributed within the limits set by personal rights) and lastly, shows how political organization 
and political obligation are justified. To do this, I will show why there must be rights at all, and 
present the analytic structure and consequences of this position. Then, I will show how Kant 
develops his system of rights on the foundation of a person, where the person takes on dual roles: 
one, as person in relation to others, and, two, as giver of law for the collective whole. 
Subsequently, I will discuss how Kant develops his system of innate, constitutional and 
international rights. I believe that the Kantian treatment of rights is capable of providing a 
foundation for a theory of personal rights, property, political obligation, and the rights of nations.  
Finally, I will present an attempt by a contemporary thinker; John Rawls to develop his system 
of rights in relation to questions of international justice and on this basis compare Kant and 
Rawls. In doing so, I will show that the Kantian notion of right is defensible as a framework for 
international relations as it is grounded in the unrestricted workings of practical reason and is 
superior to Rawls’ attempt to construct such a framework. With the Rawlsian system, the 
subjects of justice are merely capable of acting autonomously, rather than being compelled by 
practical reason to resurrect institutions that realize the freedom of all persons universally, and 
therefore, lacks moral authority and political potency as the Kantian system.  
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More specifically, the thesis is laid out as follows: Chapter One outlines the fundamental 
building blocks of the Kantian system of rights. To this end, Chapter One addresses the notion of 
a rightful condition, the role of agreement, the innate right of humanity and lastly, the concept of 
ends. Chapter Two addresses the relation between happiness, freedom and rights. And it further 
develops the Kantian system of rights by addressing the idea of representational constitutional 
government and the idea of a social contract, and its importance within the whole system.  
Chapter Three discusses how Kant derives his notion of rights of nations on the basis of rightful 
conditions that are universalizable. The second part of Chapter Three presents Kant’s derivation 
for his account of justice beyond borders from the law of practical reason.  Chapter Four 
examines how the Rawlsian theory of justice is put into practice within international contexts. 
Within this chapter, the principle of toleration and duty of assistance is addressed, as these form 
the fundamental part of the Rawlsian framework for international relations.  These four chapters 
together form the important stages in the progression of the argument that Kant’s notion of right 
is defensible as a framework for international relations. The Kantian account possesses a greater 
degree of moral authority, since it is grounded within the unrestricted workings of practical 
reason when compared to Rawls’ attempt to construct such a framework (with which it seems to 
have an affinity).  Within the Rawlsian framework, the subject of justice as a “public system of 
rule defining a scheme of activities that lead men to act together so as to produce a greater sum 
of benefits and assigns to each certain recognized claims to a share in the proceeds” (Rawls, 74). 
Rawls strives to emulate Kantian form of moral constructivism that dictates moral propositions 
are right or justified when they are the product of an appropriately designed decision procedure.   
However, Rawls’ account is distinguished from Kant by the central role that such a theory 
assigns to decision procedure that constitutes procedural interpretation of Kant’s ideas regarding 
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moral reasoning and autonomy.  Rawls’ argues that the role assigned to such a procedure is 
reflective of Kant’s view that the substance of morality is not fixed by any independent existing 
order or values. But, rather the substance is best understood as constructed by free and equal 
people under fair conditions.  This is in contrast to Kant, where the subject of justice comprises 
of agents as persons who reason about action and autonomy. This begs many questions about if 
Rawls can rightfully presuppose that people are capable of acting autonomously. Or, if they are 
just acting for the sake of autonomy, can this take the form of a universal maxim adoptable by 
all, or is it merely driven by personal inclinations? It is important to distinguish Kantian 
constructivism from the substantive accounts of justice that Rawls develops in A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism, although Rawls’s constructivism works from many of the same 
assumptions that ground his substantive political theory, Kantian constructivism provides an 
account of the structure of moral reasoning that is independent of both justice as fairness and 
political liberalism. Rather than providing or supplementing an account of a substantive moral or 
political conception, Kantian constructivism develops an approach to assessing the 
reasonableness of moral judgements. This approach can be employed to even evaluate 
substantive moral conceptions. Therefore, the Kantian approach possesses greater moral 
authority and political potency to truly be binding universally, and realize the freedoms of all 
persons.  
 
 
1. KANT’S THEORY OF RIGHTS 
A. Giving Laws to Ourselves 
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 People leave the state of nature and proceed with others into what Kant calls the rightful 
condition simply by being subject to laws. Kant proposed that the state is formed to protect 
freedom. Kant argued that in a pre-state society, any sufficiently strong person can coerce others 
into doing whatever the coercer wants. There is no true right to property or freedom or anything 
else, because there is no one who can protect them. Surely, a person can do exactly as he wants 
to do, but no one could legitimately defend him against those who oppress him. His rights, 
therefore, do not exist. The state, however, can enforce a monopoly on coercion, and legitimately 
protect the oppressed against the oppressors. Thus, Kant argued, the good of society is to 
preserve freedom. 
Within ‘The Theory of Right’, Kant introduces the idea of a Public Right. Kant defines 
Public Right as  
“the sum total of those laws which require to be made universally public in order to 
produce a state of right. It is therefore a system of laws for a people, i.e. an aggregate of 
human beings, or for an aggregate of peoples. Since these individuals or peoples must 
influence one another, they need to live in a state of right under a unifying will: that is, 
they require a constitution in order to enjoy their rights” (Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 
255).  
For Kant, the condition in which individual members are related to each other in this way 
is said to be a civil one. The state comes to be when such a union is created by the common 
interest of everyone living in a state of right. In essence, Kant conceives of a state as a union of 
an aggregate of individuals under rightful laws. This brings to life the “idea of the original 
contract”.  
The Kantian formulation of the “idea of the original contract: the act by which people 
forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only 
the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state. In 
accordance with the original contract, everyone (omnes et singuli) within a people gives up his 
external freedom in order to take it up immediately as a member of the commonwealth, that is, of 
the people considered as a state (universi). And one cannot say: the human being in a state has 
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sacrificed a part of his innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather, he has relinquished 
entirely his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as such undiminished, in a 
dependence upon laws, that is, in a rightful condition, since this dependence arises from his own 
lawgiving will” (Kant, Ibid, 199).  
 
The rightful condition for Kant is one where people as a collective body unite to rule 
themselves. Kant discusses the concept of legislative power that arises with the united will of 
people within The Metaphysics of Morals as follows:  
“The legislative power can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all right 
is supposed to emanate from this power, the laws it gives must be absolutely incapable of 
doing anyone an injustice. Now if someone makes dispositions for another person, it is 
always possible that he may thereby do him an injustice, although this is never possible in 
the case of decisions he makes for himself. Thus only the unanimous and combined will 
of everyone whereby each decides the same for all and all decide the same for each—in 
other words, the general united will of the people—can legislate” (Kant, The Metaphysics 
of Morals, 238). 
 The united will of the people justifies the legislative power as the laws that arise from 
this power have been agreed upon by all people. The Kantian concept of an ideal case is one 
where people collectively unite to rule themselves. However, in reality no actual state can hope 
to be fully congruent with this idea because it is both abstract and normative.  It would be 
difficult to find empirical instances. Kant treats the ideal case as a normative concept that is 
entirely a priori (knowledge or justification is independent of experience). This means that if a 
normative requirement fails to apply to what actually happens shows that something has gone 
wrong in the world.  If we take the concept of virtue, the fact that no human being has managed 
to meet all the requirements of virtue may be grounds for disappointment, not for revising the 
concept of virtue. The ideal case is regulative. Similarly, Kant attributes to principles of right the 
same priority over actual conduct as other normative concepts.  The fact that people often violate 
the rights of others does not mean that the concept of rights is in need of revision. The ideal case 
serves as a standard because it consistently organizes the use of power to guarantee everyone’s 
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freedom under law. In keeping with this, institutions and their officials have a duty of right to act 
in conformity with every human being’s right to freedom.  
When members of such a society unite to form a state for the purpose of legislating they 
are known as citizens. These citizens are entitled to three rightful attributes in The Metaphysics 
of Morals; Kant presents them as follows:  
“firstly, lawful freedom to obey no law other than that to which he has given consent; 
secondly, civil inequality in recognising no-one among the people as superior to himself, 
unless it be someone whom he is just as morally entitled to bind by law as the other is to 
bind to him; and thirdly, the attribute of civil independence which allows him to owe his 
existence and sustenance not to the arbitrary will of anyone else among the people, but 
purely to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth” (Kant, Ibid, 
240).  
Within the newly formed state, no citizen is obligated to follow any law other than that to 
which he has freely consented. Further, no man is superior to another such that he possesses the 
power to coerce arbitrarily another to bind to his will. Every man as a member of the 
commonwealth is entitled to his own civil independence, and his existence is not due to the 
arbitrary will of another.  
However, if such a state makes laws inconsistent with the idea of original contract it is 
defective because it creates a condition that is not rightful.  There are two ways that laws can be 
defective from the standpoint of the idea of original contract. First, particular laws can be 
inconsistent with each person’s innate right to independence. Second, the form in which laws are 
given can be defective. A system may have excellent laws but if it is not self-imposed, then it 
would still be defective. In the face of these possible defects, the state has a duty to improve 
itself. The first problem generates a duty to improve itself. And the second problem generates a 
duty on the part of the state to improve its form of lawgiving. Both these duties are internal 
duties of the state. The state can only improve its laws by means that are consistent with the 
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universal principle of right. The state may not make laws that people could not impose on itself. 
Essentially, when one person makes an arrangement for another, the first cannot be entitled to 
make an arrangement to which the other would not consent.  
B. The Role of Agreement 
Kant introduces the idea of agreement as it is necessary to explain how political authority 
can be consistent with the rights of those subject to it. Kant conceives of people as the authors of 
the laws that bind them, which acts as both a basis to, and limits, state power. The principle that 
no person can be subject to another person’s choice allows each person to be his or her master, 
that is, to have no other master. By means of this, each person’s right generates a basic constraint 
on the way in which the state may act. The application of rights is unconditional because rights 
are not tools for securing a certain result. Kant is not attempting to constrain the conduct of 
others such that it advances certain interests. This sort of application of rights would be 
considered conditional as it attempts to bring about a certain desired result. But rights are not 
conditional as “they have their root in the innate right of humanity: freedom of expression, and 
the presumption of innocence, as well as the more general right not to be subjected to the private 
purposes of another” (Ripstein, 218). It is the systematic realization of those rights that provides 
the only morally justifiable basis for the state to make, enforce or apply law.  
 Consider the following example: “The German Constitutional Court addressed the 
question whether the constitution could authorize the minister of the interior to order a hijacked 
plane to be shot down if it was in danger of being used as a missile against a populated area” 
(Ripstein, 221). The court held that such a law would conflict with the right of passengers on the 
plane to human dignity. The passengers cannot be used to save other people in the building. 
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Although the court considered the possibility that the people in the plane would consent to being 
killed in such a circumstance (given that their death was certain), the court decided that the state 
was not entitled to make such a decision. The mere fact that it would have been sensible for them 
to consent does not mean they would have consented. Their right to human dignity means that 
citizens cannot be compelled to go along with the Ministry of the Interior. The state is not 
allowed to use its citizens in such a manner to prevent a crime from happening. The German 
Constitutional Court’s reasoning sits well with the Kantian thought that the state’s obligation to 
uphold the rightful condition and protect its citizens is unconditional (Ripstein, 222). People can 
only submit themselves to laws consistent with their innate right of humanity. As a consequence 
of this, the numbers cannot matter.  For instance, if a state cannot order a person to stand in the 
path of a bullet that endangers an innocent person, it also cannot order a person to stand in a path 
of a bullet that endangers many people.   
C. The Innate Right of Humanity 
 Kant identifies the innate right of humanity as the right to be your own master. In 
addition to this, it further implies the right that no other person can be your master. Kant makes 
the innate right of humanity his basis for any further rights. All other rights that each person has 
against others are derived from this right. The same right also limits the state’s interference 
exclusively to public purposes (i.e. to preserve a system of equal freedom). This essentially 
means that the state’s power may not be used to subject one private person to the choice of 
another. All of this requires a system of equal freedom under law to be set in place. The various 
dimensions of the Kantian conception of self-mastery within a system of equal freedom in accord 
with universal law will be explored below. 
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 For Kant, the system of equal freedom is not a matter of people having equal amounts of 
some benefit but rather of the respective independence of persons from each other.  Within a 
system of equal freedom, each person is free to use his or her powers to set his or her purposes, 
and no one is allowed to compel others to use their powers to advance or accommodate any other 
person’s purposes. At the  
“level of innate right, your right to freedom protects your purposiveness--your capacity to 
choose the ends you will use your means to pursue--against the choices of others, but not 
against your own poor choices of the inadequacy of your means to your aspirations. You 
remain independent if nobody else gets to tell you what purposes to pursue with your 
means; each of us is independent if neither of us gets to tell the other what purposes to 
pursue”  (Ripstein, 34).  
 For Kant, the right to independence finds its basis in the distinctive aspect of your status 
as a person in relation to other persons. You are entitled to set your own rational purposes and 
cannot be required to act as an instrument for anyone else’s purposes. You are a sovereign not 
because you get to decide about the things that matter to you but because nobody gets to tell you 
what purposes to pursue. This holds true even if your choices fail to align with your aspirations.  
(Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 256). This Kantian notion of the right to independence is always 
an entitlement within a system of reciprocal limits of freedom so as Kant states, “The protection 
of independence and the prohibition of one person deciding what purposes another will pursue 
stand in a relation of equivalence, rather than one of a means to an end. As a result, the constraint 
the system of equal freedom places on conduct is unconditional” (Kant, Ibid, 256). This principle 
of mutual restriction applies unconditionally under law as it is not a means of achieving some 
other end.  
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 The quality of being your own master has its starting point in your right to your own 
person. This Kant considers as innate; it does not need any affirmative act to establish it. Kant 
says the following in relation to the only innate right: 
“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as 
it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, 
is the only original right belonging to every human being by virtue of his 
humanity” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 238).  
The universal principle of right demands that each person exercise his or her choices in 
ways that are consistent with the freedom of all others exercising their choices, by means of their 
innate right to freedom only restricted by universal law. To determine whether a maxim can be 
willed to become a universal law for the relation of one person’s freedom, to another, it is 
necessary and sufficient to determine whether, first, if “everyone can perform the action 
contained in the maxim, and, second, if a person can consistently will the action and will that 
everyone else performs a similar action, and influence him in the same way that he influences 
others by that action” (Kant, Ibid, 262). However, if the performance of action cannot coexist 
with everyone’s freedom according to a universal law, there is a duty not to perform it.  A 
common example to elucidate a person being used as a mere thing is the slave example. The 
slave’s problem is that he is subject to his master’s choice. Only the master gets to decide what 
to do with the slave. Here, the slave lacks the freedom to set his/her own ends and is merely a 
means for ends set by someone else. In this scenario, the slave’s right to equal freedom, that is, 
the right of no person to be, the master of another, is negated. When the criterion to determine 
sufficiency is applied, it is clear that such action cannot coexist with everyone’s freedom 
according to universal law, thus, there is a duty to omit any such action.  
14 
 
The idea of being your own master has an equivalence relation to the idea of equality. It 
is important to note though that the Kantian idea of equality does not require that people be 
treated the same way in respect to welfare or resources, only that no person is the master of 
another (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 237). The right to be your own master generates an 
“internal duty of rightful honor which consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in 
relation to others, a duty expressed by saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others 
but be at the same time an end for them” (Kant, Ibid, 237). The duty of rightful honor is 
relational in nature as there are limits on the exercise of a person’s freedom that are imposed by 
the universal principle of right. The right to be your own master also generates what Kant calls 
an internal duty of rightful honor. Though you are free to enter into binding arrangements (as 
every person is entitled to set their own purposes), when these arrangements are inconsistent 
with the humanity of your own person, your duty of rightful honor says no such arrangements 
can be binding. This also means that no person can enforce a claim of right against you that 
presupposes that you acted contrary to rightful honor. From the standpoint of a private right, 
rightful honor prevents persons from entering into arrangements that are inconsistent with 
humanity in their own person. Taken from the standpoint of public right, rightful honor prevents 
officials from making arrangements on your behalf. Further, rightful honor provides the link 
between private right and public right and, in turn, imposes a duty to leave the state of nature, 
where everyone is subject to the choice of others. By private right, Kant is referring to property 
rights, and rights in relation to others based on contract and status. For Kant, the innate right to 
freedom over your own body must be extended to things outside you. This requires a postulate 
that a free person may take control of an external object in rightful pursuit of an end. The right to 
a piece of property is basically the right to use it as a means (Kant, Ibid, 237). Ownership has a 
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“mine or yours” structure, where mine necessarily excludes others from the use of that thing. For 
Kant, the "mine or yours" structure of the right to things requires a public or omnilateral 
authorization that cannot be found in a state of nature but becomes possible only in a condition 
of right or law-governed civil society, involving an authority empowered to act in the name of 
all. Essentially, a public right refers to those conditions in which public institutions guarantee 
rights to all (Kant, Ibid, 237). 
 The Kantian account does not aspire to isolate people from the effects of other people’s 
choices. Such an independence from all effects of the actions of others violates Kant’s basic idea 
of equal freedom. For instance, you do me no wrong, if you offer a product similar to mine at a 
better price, even if that means I lose customers.  I still remain independent to do as I see fit.  All 
that a system of equal freedom requires is that no one uses his own person in way that will 
deprive another of his/hers own personhood. As Kant states concerning ends: “Since no one can 
have an end without himself making the object of his will his end, then having any end is an act 
of freedom by the agent, not an effect of nature” (Ibid 237). For Kant, a person has an end in a 
very different way from which a thing has an end. A thing has an end such that some function is 
set for it to which it is made to serve as a means. In the case of a person, a person has an end only 
when he/she sets the end. An end is a person’s end when through a conscious act of free choice 
the person adopts an object as an end. Given that a particular end is a person’s end only if it is 
adopted through free will, it is analytically impossible for anyone to compel another to have an 
end. I can be compelled by another to actions which are means to an end, but never to have an 
end. An end is a person’s own end if and only if it is chosen by free will. Since it is analytically 
impossible to compel another to adopt an end, then it is also analytically impossible to compel 
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another to perform a duty to adopt an end. Hence, the act that a duty requires can only be freely 
performed.  
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1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANT’S THEORY 
A. The Universal Principle of Rights 
 The ultimate aim of the Kantian system is to create a political system where each person 
can attain their own happiness in their own way. To ensure the existence of such a state of 
affairs, we must ensure that legal arrangements are in place to best ensure the freedom of all 
individuals. Within the Kantian political system, to ensure that rights of all individuals are 
recognized and realized, individuals must submit to laws. 
 Kant characterizes rights as conditions under which the will of one person can be united 
with the will of the others in accordance with a universal law of freedom. This principle in no 
way makes any reference to teleological considerations in the determination of rights. In other 
words, this is a formal principle. Kant discerns the principle of rights by an analysis of the 
concept of obligation. In all relations of rights, there are at least two persons involved: the person 
with the duty and the person with the power to determine that the first be coerced to perform the 
duty. Both these functions can only be performed by beings to whom actions can be imputed. In 
this relation, duties and titles are determined by universal laws. Essentially, for Kant, the concept 
of right is an idea of reason that represents the interrelation of persons in one concept. By means 
of the fact that persons are rational, the idea of rights comes to life through union of reciprocity 
and the coercion necessary to implement reciprocity. Kant insists that human beings can only be 
subject to coercive laws that are confined to governing, not personal morality or private 
happiness (Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 199). For Kant, we are only free in so far as we submit 
to the laws legally exercised on the basis of public law (that we have agreed to).  Laws are often 
thought to be coercive, but this need not necessarily be the case. An example to illustrate this 
point would be laws that dictate the speed limit in a given area. For instance, if there is a low 
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speed limit imposed in a certain neighbourhood, this law may be coercive to a given individual 
only if he wishes to drive at high speeds. However, if he enjoys driving at low speeds, this law 
may not be coercive in the slightest. In this case, driving at high speeds would be endangering 
others as a means to your ends, which in this case, would be reckless driving. Thus, such a 
maxim could never be universalized; therefore, the person has a duty to obey speed limits.   
 The purpose of the above example was to illustrate the simple point that laws are 
necessary to maintain order.  It is imperative that every fellow legislator respect the rights of his 
subjects.  The legislative power, viewed as rational principle, can only belong to the united will 
of the people. For Kant, it is only the united will of all the people- in so far as each of them 
determines the same thing about all, and all determine the same thing about each- that has the 
power of enacting a public, state and law. Thus the members of a civil society unite for the 
purpose of legislation, thereby constituting a state, where the members are called its citizens.  
Within civil society, the citizens are guaranteed three judicial attributes that inseparably 
belong to them by right. These include: first, constitutional freedom, which is the right of every 
citizen to have to obey no other law than that to which he has given consent; second, civil 
equality, which is the right of the citizen to recognize no one as superior among people in 
relation to himself; and finally, political independence, the right to owe his existence and 
continuance in society not to the arbitrary will of another, but to his own rights and powers as a 
member of the commonwealth, which cannot be represented by any other than himself (Kant, 
‘The Doctrine of Right’, 199).  In uniting and obeying the laws jointly agreed upon, citizens 
recognize that this best secures their individual interests.   Only if every self-legislator has this 
understanding, can freedom and security be extended to all. If every individual understands that 
it is in their best interests to be bound by the law, rather than taking the law in their own hands, 
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then this prevents large scale violence and promotes general security. Within the Kantian system, 
the laws are in place to better promote the interests and uphold the rights of all free 
(independent) individuals.  
Given that freedom is one of the core principles within the Kantian political philosophy 
of “Right”, we must ensure that all men are considered equal in front of the law. The law must be 
representative of the views of various individuals within a civil society; this requires that each 
citizen must have the right to participate in the government. Every individual must freely voice 
his opinion on various matters concerning their state of affairs in a civil society.  In a state of 
nature, the war of all against all prevails, but in a state where men live under law it is different. 
As Kant states, “Men are free, equal and self-dependent. This statement is derived from the idea 
of freedom. For if all individuals are free, they must necessarily be equally so; for the freedom of 
all individuals is absolute and can only universally and equally restricted by law” (Kant, 
‘Perpetual Peace’, 25).  For Kant, in a properly organized state, individuals find security and 
justice. Like Hobbes, Kant believes that in the state of nature, individuals find themselves in a 
state of war of all against all. So, this gives rise, as Reiss writes,  
“To a will that binds everyone equally…i.e. a collective universal will that alone can give 
security to each and all. Consequently, everyone has to restrict his freedom so as to make 
possible the establishment of such a supreme power and to avoid collisions with the 
freedom of others. Kant, following the tradition of his age uses the social contract to 
explain the existence of a state governing a people by a system of civil law. For Kant, 
however, the social contract must not be considered a historical fact. On this point, he 
[Kant] is quite unambiguous. Any such conception would be fraught with peril; for it is 
likely to encourage disobedience of, or even active rebellion against, the prevailing law. 
The social contract must therefore be seen as a practical Idea of reason. It is a practical 
Idea of reason in so far as it can be applied to the world of practical affairs or to 
experience, i.e.  the state which ought to be established in accordance with the principles 
of right. The social contract is thus a criterion for political judgment, but it should not 
lead us to go into historical reasons for the purpose of drawing practical conclusions” 
(Reiss, 28).  
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 For Kant, to realize our individual freedoms, the ultimate end we should strive for, is to establish 
a civil constitution. The Idea of the social contract brings to light the necessity of a civil 
constitution. As Reiss presents Kant’s view on the intricate connection between the need for the 
social contract and civil constitution, “the Idea of the social contract also implies the necessity of 
a civil constitution. While it is necessary and obligatory, as he believes, to establish a civil 
constitution, it is also the greatest practical problem for mankind to attain this end; for only in a 
civil society, universally administering right according to law, can freedom exist” (Reiss 28).    
By means of our ability to reason, we recognize that freedom can best be realized within a social 
contract that governs people by a system of civil law. 
B. Rights and ‘The Idea of a Representational Constitutional Government’ 
Kant’s political contribution to the notion of right needs to be understood in relation to 
his idea of a representative constitutional government, a fundamental aspect of his account of 
rights.  As Thomas Mertens presents Kantian conception of a republican constitution: 
“a political society ought to be conceptualized as a social contract, because moral  reason 
obliges every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could be  the result of 
the united will of a whole nation. Every subject of a political community must be 
regarded as an autonomous co-legislator whose consent is required in order to legitimize 
the laws of the nation. Such a republican constitution is, according to Kant, at the same 
time the most important condition for a lasting peace. In such a constitution the decision 
whether or not to declare war requires the consent of the citizens. And since war is 
contrary to their self-interest, the citizens will hesitate to embark on such an enterprise” 
(Mertens, 673). 
Kant wanted to provide a philosophical vindication of representative constitutional 
government, “a vindication which would guarantee respect for the political rights of all citizens” 
(Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, 4).  Presumably, all citizens would encompass men, women and in turn 
any lifestyles they would choose for themselves freely, so long as it did not  undermine others’ 
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freedoms. Kant’s aim in providing a foundation for a representative constitutional government 
was to secure conditions of freedom where the idea of a right is realized.  
To fully appreciate the origins of a secular natural order where rights of the individuals 
take centre stage, it is necessary to read Kant’s political thoughts within the context of the 
eighteenth century. During this time, the French and American revolutions were influenced by 
the various ideas of the Enlightenment. This revolutionary period was characteristic of a growth 
of self-awareness of the power of man’s mind to subject himself and the world to rational 
analysis.  The significance of the revolution to Kant’s political thought becomes apparent 
through the following passage by Reiss,  
“If it is correct to infer this link between Kant’s philosophy and the ideas of the 
two major eighteenth-century revolutions, the significance of Kant’s political thoughts 
 becomes clear; for the American and French revolutions constituted an open break with 
 the political past. An appeal was made to a secular natural order and to the political 
 rights of individuals for the purpose of initiating large-scale political action. The 
 revolutions, of course, arose from political social and economic situations in America 
 and France, but the beliefs of the revolutionaries were not intended as a smoke-screen 
 designed to mislead the public. They depended on a political philosophy in which a 
 belief in the right of the individual would be guaranteed” (Reiss 4).   
During the time of the French and American revolutions, the political problem that Kant and 
other prominent philosophers concerned themselves with was how to turn a state of war into a 
state of order and peace. Kant’s primary concern was how to go about safeguarding an 
individual’s status as a rational independent being within the bounds of a civil state. To bring 
about this peaceful world order where an individual’s status as a rational independent being can 
be safeguarded, Kant recognized the need to establish principles that can meet the demands of 
justice. Any coherent political order, for Kant, had to be based on maxims that can be formulated 
into universal laws; only these could hope to meet the demands of justice and realize a just and 
lasting order. According to the criterion that maxims must meet in order to hold as universal 
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laws, it is necessary and sufficient to determine whether, first, if “everyone can perform the 
action contained in the maxim, and, second, if a person can consistently will the action and will 
that everyone else performs a similar action, and influence him in the same way that he 
influences others by that action” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 230). 
For Kant, “Right is to be found only in the external relations which are the proper 
business of politics” (Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, 21). External relations arise because we have 
possessions, ‘an external mine and thine’ as Kant refers to it (Kant, Ibid, 21). These relations 
must be placed under rules. Just like Hobbes, for Kant, politics belongs to the sphere of human 
experience, where man’ will can be coerced by another will (all actions are ultimately reduced to 
will). When coercion is exercised according to a universal principle, it is law.   And legality is 
the decisive principle within the domain of politics. In turn, any moral decision of the inner man 
must find its outward expression in legality (through actions that conform with law). However, 
we can never fully be certain about another person’s inner life; this is not the task of politics or 
that of legislation (to influence in any way another person’s thought). Every individual is free to 
indulge in their own thoughts, and further, by means of this freedom, is able to desire various 
things in the world. This subsequently gives rise to the hypothetical right to acquire anything in 
the world of nature. All individuals have the right to acquire possessions and expressing their 
freedom could lead to collisions between them. In order to avoid such collisions between 
freedoms, the freedom of each individual has to be regulated in a universally binding manner 
such that the pursuit of their respective ends does not interfere with the freedom of others. By 
means of his theory of rights, Kant is attempting to reconcile the free action of one individual 
with the freedom of others. In accordance with this idea, Kant formulates the universal law: 
“Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables freedom of each individual’s will to 
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coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (Kant, 
‘Perpetual Peace’, 23).  
C. The State and Constitutional Rights  
Within a civil society, rights are negative in nature. Here, right is a restriction of each 
individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else.  As Kant puts it, 
“All rights consist solely in the restriction of the freedom of others, with the qualification 
that their freedom can co-exist with my freedom within the terms of the general law; and 
public right in a commonwealth is simply a state of affairs regulated by a real legislation 
which conforms to this principle and is backed up by power, and under which a whole 
people live as subjects in a lawful state. This is what we call a civil state, and it is 
characterized by equality in the effects and counter-effects of freely willed actions which 
limit one another in accordance with the general law of freedom” (Kant, Ibid, 76).  
By limiting one and another, and willingly accepting restrictions imposed on us, we 
realize our equality within a civil state. Under such a civil state, the birthright of each individual 
is absolutely equal, in so far as the individual only submits to those coercive laws such that his 
freedom harmonizes with that of others. In a commonwealth such as this, no member can have a 
hereditary privilege against his fellow subjects (Kant, Ibid, 76). Putting this in terms of rights, his 
fellow subjects have no advantage over him. As a member of the commonwealth, every citizen is 
a co-legislator. But to be a self-legislator requires freedom, equality and unity of the will of all 
members.   In order for this unity to come about, all members must freely and independently 
unite and form the will of the people. This united will of the people is called the “original 
contract”. However, an entire group of people cannot be expected to reach unanimity; one can 
only hope for a majority of vote. A fundamental part of the contract that must be accepted is that 
majority decisions must be accepted. 
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For a civil state to be considered lawful, it needs to be based on a priori principles. For 
Kant, right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom such that it harmonises with the 
freedom of everyone else (such that it is possible within the terms of a general law). And it is the 
public right which is the distinctive quality of external laws that makes this harmony possible. A 
civil constitution is constituted of free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain 
their freedom within the general union with their fellows. The civil constitution is the 
requirement of pure reason, which legislates a priori (knowledge or justification is independent 
of experience), regardless of empirical needs. Thus the civil state is a product of pure rational 
principle whose justification is not dependent on experience. Such a civil state is based on the 
following a priori principles:  
1. “The freedom of every member of a society as a human being; 
2. The equality of each with all the others as a subject; 
3. The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen” (Kant, Ibid, 74). 
These principles represent pure practical reason and, only in accordance with these can a lawful 
civil state be established. Within The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents freedom as 
only one of all the ideas of speculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without, 
however, understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral law which we know. Kant’s 
moral theory is deontological in nature; moral worth is an intrinsic feature of human actions, 
determined by formal rules of conduct. So, moral obligation rests solely on duty, without 
requiring any reference to practical consequences that dutiful actions may have. 
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The principles arrived upon for the civil state has moral worth as they are determined by 
formal rules. More specifically, the first principle can be expressed as follows, “No-one can 
compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may 
seek happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of 
everyone else within the workable general law- i.e. he must accord to others the same right he 
enjoys himself” (Kant, Ibid, 74). The freedom of every member in a society as a human being is 
realized in a patriotic government, not a paternal one.  In a paternal government, every member 
of society is treated as an immature child who is unable to distinguish between what is truly 
useful or harmful to them; they are obliged, therefore, to follow passively and rely on the 
judgment of the head of the state.   
Although an individual recognizes the need to comply with laws, he is often misled 
within a civil society by his self-seeking animal inclinations, and often exempts himself from the 
law. This raises the need for a master within a civil society, who will force man to obey a 
universally valid will under which everyone can be free.  In contrast to a paternal government, 
where despotism prevails, a patriotic state is one where everyone in the state regards the 
“commonwealth as a maternal womb from which he himself sprang and which he must leave to 
his descendents as a treasured pledge” (Kant, Ibid, 74). Under such a system, each member is 
responsible to protect the rights of the commonwealth by means of the laws of the general will, 
rather than submitting it to his personal use at his own absolute pleasure (realizing freedom as a 
condition of moral law). Every member of the commonwealth is entitled to the right of freedom 
so long as each is capable of possessing rights. Kant says the following about a patriotic attitude:  
“Each regards himself as authorised to protect the rights of the commonwealth by laws of the 
general will, but not to submit it to his personal use at his own absolute pleasure. This right of 
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freedom belongs to each member of the commonwealth as a human being, in so far as each is a 
being capable of possessing rights” (Kant, Ibid, 74).  
The second principle is the equality of each with all others as subjects. The uniform 
equality of subjects within the state is perfectly consistent with inequality in attributes and 
possession, whether they are mental or physical. In spite of any mental or physical differences, 
all subjects within the state are considered equal in front of the law.   The equality of the 
members with all others in a civil state is not based on equality of possessions or physical or 
mental equality with respect to others. That is, no one can coerce another by any means other 
“than through the public law and its executor, the head of the state, while everyone else can resist 
others in the same way and to the same degree” (Kant, Ibid, 75). Since all members within the 
state are equal, no individual can coerce another through any means other than the proper 
channels of law when necessary. In addition, no member of a civil society can renounce all his 
rights by means of a contract such that he only has duties, not rights. The very act of making a 
social contract only works under the assumption that I have certain rights. 
When individuals willingly become part of the social contract they consent to the idea of 
equality of all men within the state. Every individual within a state is entitled to reach any degree 
of rank through his talent, industry and good fortune and his fellow subjects may not stand in the 
way.  Given that all individuals are considered equal as subject before law, “no fellow subject 
may stand in his way by hereditary prerogatives or privileges of rank and thereby hold him and 
his descendants back indefinitely” (Kant, Ibid, 75). Individuals willingly enter into a civil 
constitution by means of a social contract as reason prescribes one to do so in an attempt to 
secure principles of equality, security and justice while escaping distress and violence.  
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To conclude this chapter, Kant’s treatment of the state is aimed at developing the claim 
that interpersonal human relations must be accomplished by law, and this can only be governed 
within a political community. Within this constitution, Kant preserves the innate right to 
freedom, as this forms the basis of the preconstitutional rights which supply laws for any rightful 
constitution. Here, the idea of social contract supplies the idea of a general will uniting 
individuals. Such a rightful constitution possesses all the fundamental elements to be extended 
across boundaries such that they provide a comprehensive doctrine of rights, allowing all 
individuals to escape states of distress and violence.  
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2. KANT’S THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. Kant and the Right of Nations 
Kant recognizes that proper institutions must be in place to give rise to the rightful 
condition. In recognition of this, the Kantian project puts forth philosophical principles on which 
a just and lasting order could be established.  Within ‘‘The Doctrine of Right’’, Kant remarks, 
“irresistible veto: there is no war either between human beings or between states” (Kant, ‘The 
Doctrine of Right’, 354). For Kant, the contrast between right and violence is equivalent to peace 
and war.  Further, Kant treats the case of human beings and states as parallel. Much like human 
beings organize themselves within a civil state bound by laws, states too should organize within 
a republic to avoid violence among neighboring states.  
Kant opens his discussion of states with the claim that they are naturally in a “nonrightful 
condition” (Kant, Ibid, 354). The state of non-rightful condition is a condition of war where each 
can only do what seems good and right to it. According to Kant, to remain in such a condition is 
to commit a wrong in the highest degree. Much like individuals, nations should exit from the 
original state of nature and organize themselves in accordance with the idea of the original 
contract. From this it might mistakenly be assumed that Kant is in favor of some sort of a 
transnational superstate. However, within ‘‘The Doctrine of Right’’, Kant explicitly argues that 
world state would extend too far over vast regimes, and governing it would be impossible. 
Kant’s reasoning for rejecting a superstate goes back to the idea of the rightful condition. Kant 
favors a pacific league or a permanent congress of states as opposed to a world state (Kant, Ibid, 
354).   A permanent congress of states can be renounced by its members, and republican states 
do not go to war with each other.  The only time a state is entitled to use defensive force is when 
it is faced with an aggressor. The use of defensive force must be subjected to objective standards: 
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can such force be reasonably used by all parties in a dispute when necessary? No state has the 
right to engage in acts of aggression against one another. Each state only has the right to defend 
itself. That being said, in ‘Perpetual Peace’, Kant recognizes that war sometimes does arise 
between nations. In such a scenario, there must be some sort of a court system that extends over 
the congress of states to resolve conflicts when they arise.  
The distinctive nature of the state is an important piece within the Kantian System of 
Rights.  Though Kant draws parallels between the state and private persons, there are also some 
crucial differences to note. The first difference is that states do not have external objects of 
choice. Individuals can form a desire to acquire things, and then pursue those things bound by 
universalizable principles. However, states do not have the ability to do so.  Further, the state 
does not acquire its territory; rather, its territory is just a spatial manifestation of the state (Kant 
in Ripstein, 228). Much like a person, a state is always in possession of its body. Anyone who 
enters a state without authorization is committing a wrong. This is analogous to battery in 
persons. Each state’s right against other states is purely defensive; this right is essential for the 
state to continue to be in the rightful condition, where it is the master of its own territory. The 
public nature of the state restricts the purposes for which it can act while sustaining its own 
character within the rightful condition. Unlike a person, a state is not allowed to set and pursue 
its own private ends but rather it can only pursue public ones. Due to this restriction, the state 
could never have grounds for going to war except in the case of its own self defense (Kant, ‘The 
Doctrine of Right’, 346). When faced with indeterminacy of the right to self-defence, Kant calls 
for a solution somewhat analogous to a civil condition. The permanent congress of states should 
establish a procedure in keeping with the ideals of public right for deciding disputes in a civil 
way. This includes using lawsuits to resolve disputes about boundaries rather than the way of 
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savages, namely by war. When states are in a rightful condition, the plurality of states are able to 
realize the condition of public right.  
Within Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: “The task of establishing a universal 
and permanent peaceful life is not only a part of the theory of law within the framework of pure 
reason, but per se an absolute and ultimate goal. To achieve this goal, a state must become the 
community of a large number of people, living provided with legislative guarantees of their 
property rights secured by a common constitution. The supremacy of this constitution… must be 
derived a priori from the considerations for achievement of the absolute ideal in the most just and 
fair organization of people’s life under the aegis of public law” (Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, 55).  Kant argues that moral-practical reason within us utters this irresistible veto: 
“There shall be no war” (Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 354). The use of force by any state to 
compel another is to engage in war.  Clearly, such a use of force violates the rights of nations, 
thus elimination of war becomes the task of international law. Ultimately, Kant is striving to put 
forth conditions for perpetual peace. For Kant, peace simply means the end of all hostilities. In 
this case, essentially to realize conditions of perpetual peace, there needs to be an end to all 
hostilities. The only way perpetual peace becomes possible is if states relate to one another 
through laws that determine rights. If states conform to the principles of right, then continued 
coexistence will result in a state of peace. Thus, perpetual peace only becomes achievable 
through conformity to international law. The only reasonable solution to achieving peace is 
through the states’ universal adherence to law. It is not enough to secure peace internally within 
the states. It is further necessary that conditions of peace are secured externally, to ensure 
potential conflicts don’t arise with neighbours. Further, Kant suggests that if in any relation of 
persons, a principle circumscribing external freedom through laws is missing; the structure will 
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unavoidably collapse (Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 354). And the cause of this collapse will be 
war that the conflict produces. Given that moral and practical reason dictates that war must be 
avoided, we have a moral obligation to achieve peace, which can only be achieved by submitting 
to a civil condition where conflicts are resolved by means of laws rather than brute arbitrary 
force. Kant calls for all states to submit to a general will which includes the appropriate political 
institutions in place to determine, enforce and apply laws.  
 In the interest of avoiding war, all states must voluntarily submit to the rule of law within 
the federation of republics to resolve disputes. Kant claims that republicanism must replace 
despotism within individual states. Any state remaining despotic will always in principle be in a 
state of war. The first definitive structure for realizing conditions of peace is ensuring that the 
civil constitution of each state shall be republican. Within a republic, there are significant 
practical difficulties involved in declaring war.  In times of war, it is the people who suffer the 
most due to the costs associated with war and rebuilding after the war: with this knowledge, 
people would be extremely cautious when consenting to war. However, in a state run by a 
despot, people would not be consulted even though they would be most affected. The despot 
does not stand to suffer much personally even if his side loses, thus he has less prudential reasons 
to avoid war. Rather, within a republic (where the general will rules), people can trust the 
authorities to adhere to law when it comes to international relations. Furthermore, Kant is 
contends that there can be no rule of law and no peace unless states can be trusted to commit 
themselves to law without there being an international executive force to ensure obedience to 
laws through force (Kant, Ibid, 355). The only way states can be trusted to commit to the laws is 
if their internal constitution is republican in nature. So, if every state willingly agrees to become 
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part of a world federation in an attempt to avoid war, this would put us in a better position to 
secure perpetual peace. 
B. Kant, Reason and Justice Beyond Borders  
Kant begins his discussion for justice with the requirement that reasoned thought and 
action must adhere to principles that could be fully public.  Within his essay from What Does it 
Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking, Kant argues that nothing could deserve to be called reason 
if it were wholly without structure and discipline. For Kant, the minimal condition for any 
discourse to count as reasoned is that it be communicable, and that it is followable by all whom it 
is intended to reach.  Kant’s favoured image of public reason is scholarly communication 
with the world at large. For Kant, in the absence of a structure there will be no communication 
and prior to in turn, no reasoning. Reasons are those sorts of things that we can give to others, 
refuse or receive from others. Kant asks the following question, “how much and how correctly 
would we think if we did not think as it were in community with others to whom we 
communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us?” (Kant in O’Neill, 48). 
According to Onora O’Neill’s interpretation of Kant, the standards of reason cannot be found in 
solitary thinking, but, rather, for Kant, those who seek to reason must structure their thought and 
speech in ways others can follow.  Within solitary thinking, ideas are not subjected to public 
reason and so are not open to refutation by others. Kant rejects the idea that reasons could be 
devised by the arbitrary fiat of individual reasoners (O’ Neill, 54). Kant often fiercely chastises 
those who think reason could be without any structure. Furthermore, unstructured reason will not 
lead to liberation of thought but rather to a disaster.  
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 Given that “lawless thinking ends not in freedom of thinking or communication but 
gibberish and isolation, even in superstition and cognitive disorientation, whose political 
consequences include vulnerability to tyrants and demagogues, then any activity in human life 
that can count as reasoned must be structured” (O’Neill, 55). It is imperative that public reason 
possess structure: this allows us to determine which claims to accept and which to reject. 
However, this begs the question: What forms the structure of public reason? Kant answers in a 
straightforward manner: “Freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws 
except those, which it gives itself; and its opposite is the maxim of a lawless use of reason” 
(Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 145). Thus, public uses of reason must have law like structure 
rather than lawless structure. Reason has this structure when we give it to others, receive or 
refuse to receive from others (O’Neill, 54). However, for Kant, one cannot derive their law like 
structure from external sources; instead, must be freely chosen. The discipline of reason is that of 
self-legislation or autonomy. By means of this, Kant, identifies practical reasoning with 
autonomy. The contemporary understanding of autonomy identifies it with mere freedom and 
independence rather than reason. More specifically, autonomy is considered on an individual 
basis, and it is generally associated with the capacity to be one’s own person (for instance, 
choosing how to live one’s life based on their own reasons and not of the product of external 
forces). This could mean choosing to go to medical school out of your own free volition.  Kant 
views  
“autonomy or self-legislation as emphasizing not some (rather amazing sort of) self that 
does the legislating, but rather legislation that is not borrowed from unvindicated sources, 
that is not derivative, that is both freely chosen and has the form of law. Non-derivative 
'legislation' cannot require us to adopt the actual laws or rules of some institution or 
authority; it can therefore only require that any principle we use to structure thought or 
action be law-like, that it have the form of law” (O’ Neill, 56).   
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Kant identifies reasoning with the practice of  adopting principles of thinking and 
acting that have the form of law, which can be adopted by all: “To make use of one’s own 
reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, 
whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a 
universal principle for the use of reason” (Kant, Ibid, 56).  
The only principles that can form laws are those that are chosen freely, only those can 
hope to meet the demands of Kantian autonomy, such that they are universalizable, and shows a 
commitment to Kantian notions of public reason (based on his conception of practical reason). 
Rather than presuming that something is reasonable because it is liked or even accepted, Kant 
puts forth “modal conditions” that all discourse (pertaining to justice) must meet in order to be 
fully public, thus, fully reasoned. Modal conditions are necessary inseparable properties all 
discourse must meet. It is public reason that makes it feasible to think from the standpoint of 
everyone else (the maxim of enlarged thought). This allows persons to see one’s own initial 
judgment from the standpoint of others, listening to what all others judge and communicate.  
Kantian faith in communication (public reason or publicity) allows rational persons to mutually 
agree upon a set of rules and principles that are universalizable (Kant, Ibid, 56). Once publicity is 
acknowledged, individuals can progress towards the ideal state, such as a republicanism or world 
government.  An adequate application of Kant’s project perpetual peace aims to indiscriminately 
facilitate the access of individuals, political groups, and state to the public sphere.  It is important 
to note that the Kantian notion of justice is not grounded in the concept of the state.   Any 
approach of justice that is grounded in the concept of a state shows blatant disregard for the 
moral standing of others.    By others, Kant is referring to those on the far side of borders who 
are affected by our economic and foreign policies.  This Kantian idea can be derived from his 
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humanity principle, which states that humanity either in ourselves or others should not be treated 
as a means but as an end. Since war is in direct violation of such a principle, human actions are 
subjected to the moral law, including the maxim that there shall be no war in political practice.  
However, this can only be put into political practice if there is a system of representation of the 
general will as in the case of republics.  This will result in a republican pacifism across states 
boundaries.  Within, The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that republican constitution is 
created in such a way that it avoids war by its very nature.   Ultimately, Kant is envisioning a 
world where cosmopolitan just principles are realistically institutionalized. And this does not call 
for a world without borders. It calls for a world where further institutional structures that support 
international justice across states can be instantiated. This is necessary for cosmopolitan justice 
to be realized in the fullest sense (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 145). In such a world, 
justice within republican states would be complimented by structures that support international 
justice and the idea of cosmopolitan right. The notion of just republican states, international 
justice and cosmopolitan right are grounded in principles that can be universalized and adopted 
by all. In order to realize universal principles of justice, these laws must be instituted through a 
plurality of bounded republican states that are linked by their joint commitment to international 
justice and cosmopolitan right. For Kant, republican states are not ideally just.  However, this is a 
compromise we have to make in order to secure freedom in real world conditions. Further, this 
also means that boundaries are not invariably just; the inclusion and exclusions they secure may 
be unjust actions towards outsiders. In recognition of the fact that the construction of boundaries 
is somewhat arbitrary, the Kantian notion of justice does not preclude the possibility of other 
institutions beyond the state to institutionalize justice (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 145).  
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Within the Kantian picture, states are the primary vehicles of justice; however, some of 
the other institutions that may contribute to justice include churches and non-governmental 
organizations, where states are weak. Kant recognizes that sometimes these institutions could 
contribute to injustices as well. However, he envisions a state of affairs where new institutions 
arise to better secure justice between and within states such that Universal Principle of Justice is 
better realized.    
To conclude this chapter, much like individuals, for Kant, states need to move into the 
rightful condition as moral practical reason dictates the irresistible veto, “There shall be no war” 
(Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 354). Thus, Kant is attempting to put forth necessary conditions 
to realize perpetual peace, which essentially means an end to all hostilities. And the only 
reasonable solution is for states to make sure their international constitution is republican in 
nature and conforms to international law (such that all states universally adhere to law). For 
Kant, the only principles that can form law are those that can meet the demands of autonomy, 
show a commitment to public reason and are universalizable. To extend justice beyond borders, 
all discourse pertaining to justice must meet be fully public. Thus, the Kantian account of justice 
beyond borders is grounded in the working of pure practical reasons such that principles of 
justice can publicly be reasoned giving rise to universalizable international laws. In the following 
chapters, a critical examination of how Kant’s theory holds moral authority and political potency 
compared to other contemporary accounts, such as that of Rawls, will be seen below.  
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3. RAWL’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 
A. A Reconstruction of A Theory of Justice  
Within the following chapter, the Rawlsian theory of justice will be examined. However, 
prior to a more detailed examination of Rawls’ theory of justice, it is important to note the 
similar aspirations and differences between the Kantian and Rawlsian theory of justice.  
Kant’s theory of justice was significantly influenced by the ideas of the French and American 
revolutions. The revolutions marked a break with the political past, where Christian theology still 
played a key part in shaping revolutionary thinking in the West. An appeal was now made for a 
secular order and the political rights of the individual took centre stage, which initiated large 
scale political action. Within Kantian theory we get the seemingly-paradoxical space between the 
claim, on the one hand, that individuals have a duty to achieve their own self-legislational 
autonomy and, on the other hand, that the state is absolutely sovereign. This is vital to Kantian 
practice of democracy: that a democratic polity ought self-consciously to contain and continually 
to re-instantiate the duality between political authority and the civic culture.  
Traditionally liberalism is conceived as a theory about the state and about the people's 
relation to the state. The function of the state is to have an essential internal institutional 
structure, which enables it to carry out the people's will, in whatever way this is conceived. This 
prevents it from becoming tyrannical. Within the liberal system, the people are thought to have 
duties (that are legally binding) toward the state and possess rights of non-interference secured 
against it. In this way, the liberal theory sets limits and duties for its citizens.  
Kant, by contrast, has only the most minimal theories of the state and of the relation between 
populace and state. Kant does not prescribe specific institutional arrangements that any state 
ought to reflect in order to be regarded as legitimate.  For Kant, the state by virtue of its 
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existence is legitimate and deserving of respect. Unlike the liberal conception, people have no 
prior or natural rights against the state. The Kantian theory begins with the state. Within The 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes is clear that only by being absorbed into the polity subject to 
legal authority that one's natural rights become fully determinate. Ultimately, natural rights are 
discovered a priori by means of practical reason in its political employment, only determinate in 
the rightful condition.  Practical reason dictates the transition to a civic constitution, where rights 
can be determinate. Thus, it is in the interest of the subjects of form a civic constitution as this is 
as much as in avoiding violence as making private right determinate under the formal dictate of 
the universal law of right (Kant, ‘The Doctrine of Right’, 352) 
In light of the French and American revolutions, the Kantian project concerned itself with the 
problems of human freedom. Further, Kant attempted to provide philosophical principles on 
which a just and lasting internal order and world peace could be based. Much like Kant, the 
Rawlsian project attempts to bring the world closer to conditions of perpetual peace.  Further 
Rawls’ The Law of Peoples attempts to sketch out a response to the problems of illiberal 
societies, pluralism and toleration that were becoming increasingly prevalent in the twentieth 
century. Rawls’ principle of equal basic liberties aims to generalize the principle of religious 
toleration. And the Rawlsian theory of justice is in part a response to the problem of political 
legitimacy despite religious conflict.  Here the Rawlsian theory of justice will be critically 
examined, illuminating its shortcomings: it relies on abstract hypothetical conditions rather than 
with unlike; the Kantian system, which builds around the prior state of the nature and is 
grounded in the unrestricted workings of practical reason.  
The Rawlsian theory aims to develop principles that can be used to assess the basic 
structure of society, more specifically, the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
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fundamental rights and duties (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 7). Rawls is concerned with 
instantiating the appropriate institutions that align with his theory of justice, as these institutions 
profoundly affect man from the very beginning. The initial structure that man is born into 
consists of various social positions. The social position that man is born into affects their social 
expectations of their life that remains to be determined. Such expectations are also determined in 
part by their economic and political circumstances. Rawls elaborates: 
“In this way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are 
especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s initial 
chances in life….It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of 
any society, to which principles of social justice must in the first instance apply” (Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice, 7).  
 In recognition of the fact that these inequalities are somewhat arbitrary, Rawls attempts to 
construct just principles that all people within a society can jointly agree on. To this end, Rawls 
conceives of the idea of the “original position”. The original position is an imaginary meeting 
where, “those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles 
which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefit” 
(Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11). For Rawls, such a meeting and the people who choose are 
merely hypothetical. These people are making their choices not in a primitive state of nature but 
rather in a carefully designed hypothetical situation. By means of such a situation, Rawls is 
trying to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed upon will be just. Further, Rawls is 
of the view that when the hypothetical contractees begin to reason within appropriate constraints, 
then the principles they select will be justifiable principles of justice.  The most important 
constraint concerns knowledge available to the hypothetical contractees. They are aware that 
they are choosing principles for a society where they must live together in conditions of 
moderate scarcity. They also realize that though they may have somewhat similar needs and 
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interests, each of them has their own rational life plan. This means that they each have different 
ends and purposes, which could result in conflicting claims in regard to the natural and social 
resources available. In addition, Rawls is willing to permit his “contractees access to certain 
general laws and facts about human society: they understand political affairs and the principles 
of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human 
psychology” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 137). However, in regard to themselves, the 
hypothetical contractees know virtually nothing. When choosing the principles of justice, Rawls 
requires that the hypothetical contractees choose from behind the “veil of ignorance”. Behind the 
veil of ignorance, no one is allowed any information about his natural talents, abilities, tastes and 
preferences, position in society, or particulars about his own rational life plan. The veil of 
ignorance ensures that hypothetical contractees make an objective and impartial choice by 
depriving the choosers of information that can be considered arbitrary from a moral point of 
view. Since none of the contractees know how the various principles will affect their situation, 
they will have to evaluate solely based on general considerations. This begs the question, if 
people know nothing about their plans and desires; on what basis can they make any choices at 
all? Rawls answers this question by introducing the idea of primary social goods. For Rawls, 
primary goods are those resources that every rational man is presumed to need and want. As 
Rawls suggests “with more of these goods men can generally be assured of greater success in 
carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be” (Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, 92). These primary social goods consist of rights, liberties, opportunities, 
wealth, income and self-respect (person’s sense of value).  Of these primary social goods, Rawls 
considers self-respect to be the most important, without it, he believes our plans will seem 
worthless.  
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 The contractees are mutually disinterested when they meet each other. Each contractee 
strives to maximize the bundles of primary social goods for himself. The goal is to choose 
principles that give rise to a stable society based on reasonable principles. To arrive upon these 
reasonable principles, Rawls constructs a formal model of rationally self-interested individuals 
engaged in a bargaining game (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 93). This bargaining game is a non-
zero sum game, where the aim is for players to arrive at unanimous agreement on a set of 
principles that will henceforth serve as the criteria for evaluating institutions and practices. The 
game will consist of a series of proposals made by each player for consideration by the rest, and 
the play terminates when there is unanimous agreement on a single set of principles. Within the 
game, the players are assumed to be rationally self-interested. However, they are also assumed to 
operate under an additional constraint, where once agreement has been reached upon a set of 
principles chosen on the basis of a calculation of self-interest, those principles will be abided by 
in all future cases, even when it is not in one’s own self-interest to do so.   Rawls speaks to this 
in “Justice as Fairness”: “having a morality is analogous to having made a firm commitment in 
advance; for one must acknowledge the principles of morality even when to one’s disadvantage” 
(Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness’, 164). Suppose an unequal distribution results, in that case, Rawls 
finds this scenario acceptable so long as the redistribution of that surplus can make everyone 
better off under a pattern of equality. The Rawlsian system allows for such inequalities as long as 
it works to everyone’s benefit. Within the Rawlsian system, the subject determines the laws as 
there is no prior institutional context. But to will such a context is to will away what Kant calls 
lawless freedom. In such cases subjects are acting on their own notions of justice, which 
essentially, for Kant, is just another way of describing the state of nature.  
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In recognition of some of the consequences of his theory, within Justice as fairness, 
Rawls stresses that no individual should accept any unequal distribution that pushes some roles 
below the equality baseline in order to raise others above it. This gives rise to Rawls’ two 
principles that all players will agree to:  
“First, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the 
most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all. Second, social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 60).  
For Rawls, “social and economic inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that 
they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which 
they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 61).  
The first principle refers to liberty rather than wealth, or income, or rewards. By means of the 
first clause, Rawls is suggesting that the output (or earnings) of a practice is to be distributed 
equally, unless some pattern of unequal distribution can be worked out for everyone’s benefit. 
And the second principle defines what sorts of inequalities are permissible. Rawls appears to 
present the second principle as grounds on which the presumption (of equal distribution) can be 
set aside. The basic liberties protected by the first principle are what Rawls calls the liberties of 
citizenship, which include freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought, freedom of the person along with prior right to hold property, and freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and seizure. However, these do not include economic liberties such as freedom to 
own property in the means of production, freedom of contract, or the right to inherit or to leave 
one’s possessions to persons of one’s choice (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 61). Suppose a society 
adopted these two principles, how would they be applied when a dispute arose? The first 
principle is assigned priority because Rawls assumes that below a certain level of wealth it is 
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impossible to exercise one’s liberties effectively. Any inequalities of wealth and authority must 
be arranged in ways consistent with equal liberties required by the first principle.  
Rawls’ first principle requires a constitution granting all citizens an equal right in 
determining the outcome of the process that establishes the laws that they have agreed to comply 
with.   The authority to determine social policies rests with the legislature, which is elected by 
the public for a fixed term, and is accountable to them.  During elections, each person’s vote 
should hold the same weight in determining the outcome of the elections. Rawls believes that 
equal political liberty is the best guarantee of just and efficient legislation. And further, equal 
freedoms required by the theory “strengthen men’s sense of their own worth, enlarge their 
intellectual and moral sensibilities, and lay the basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon 
which stability of just institutions depends” (Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 58). However, Rawls 
does not want to argue that these liberties are absolute. Rather, Rawls believes that the original 
contractees would be willing to recognize two sorts of limitations on their freedoms as permitted 
within a just society. The first limitation suggests that basic liberties can be restricted when 
necessary to strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all. To determine when a restriction 
is acceptable, Rawls asks the following question; will a representative citizen consider this as a 
gain for his freedom on the balance? For instance, at times, it is justifiable to impose certain 
limits on speech, in the absence of all limitations (there would be no way to maintain some form 
of order) fruitful discussion would never be possible. The second limitation suggests that 
liberties may be limited in societies that have not yet reached the level of wealth at which they 
can be effectively exercised. Under these circumstances, such restrictions will be justifiable 
(Rawls, Ibid, 58). This is in light of the fact that the long run benefits may be great enough to 
transform a less fortunate society into one where equal liberties could be enjoyed.  Rawls’ theory 
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only permits infringements upon rights when necessary to either protect the whole system of 
basic liberties or increase the probability of effective exercise of those liberties in the future.  
B. Rawlsian Theory in Practice- Principle of Toleration   
 So how do the Rawlsian principles shape relations between societies? Within The Law of 
Peoples, Rawls develops the idea of toleration among peoples, as the guide to proper 
international relations. When Rawls speaks of the principle of toleration, he is not referring to 
toleration among individuals, but rather to a world-society composed of different peoples. For 
Rawls, the main task in extending The Law of Peoples to non-liberal people is to specify how far 
liberal peoples are to tolerate non liberal peoples. According to Rawls, “toleration of non-liberal 
peoples means not only to omit exercising political sanctions- military, economic, or diplomatic-
to make people change its ways”, but it also means “to recognize these non-liberal societies as 
equal participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples, with certain rights and 
obligations” (Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 59).  It appears toleration of peoples means non-
intervention and respect.  Why is toleration important in the relations between liberal and non-
liberal (decent peoples)? Rawls points out that even in liberal societies, “there are reasonable and 
expected differences of peoples from one another, with their distinctive institutions and 
languages, religions and cultures, as well as their different histories, variously situated as they 
are in different regions and territories of the world and experiencing different events” (Rawls, 
Ibid, 54-55). This diversity is even greater between liberal and non-liberal peoples. In 
recognition of the fact that non liberal peoples are also decent peoples within world society who 
are moral agents, they should also be entitled to due respect and toleration. The self-respect of 
people shouldn’t be violated without good reason. If we fail to extend the proper due respect to 
non-liberal peoples, this could lead to negative consequences. For instance,  
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“if liberal peoples require that all societies be liberal and subject those that are not to 
politically enforced sanctions, then decent non-liberal peoples- if there are such-will be 
denied due measure of respect by liberal peoples. This lack of respect may wound the self-
respect of decent non liberal peoples as peoples, and may lead to great bitterness and 
resentment” (Rawls, Ibid, 61).  
Even non-liberal peoples are decent peoples who have the ability of moral learning; therefore 
significant room should be preserved for them to determine themselves. Within A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls addresses the toleration of non-liberal societies, as this will encourage mutual 
trust and confidence among various societies. For Rawls, decent peoples will gradually learn that 
the laws prescribed within the law of peoples are advantageous for them.  
C. The Scope of Justice for Rawls beyond Borders 
Within A Theory of Justice, Rawls refrained from extending his theory of justice as 
fairness to international problems. In his later essay, “The Law of Peoples”, Rawls’ attempts to 
work out an alternative approach to international extension of justice as fairness, however, this 
account falls short as an account of international justice as fairness.   
Ultimately the Rawlsian project concerns itself with how the content of The Law of 
Peoples might be developed out of a liberal idea of justice similar to, but more generally out of a  
liberal idea of justice as fairness. Rawls also puts forth a set of principles that liberal 
representatives would choose to govern associations with other types of societies. These 
principles forms the content of the basis upon which liberal and non-liberal people may agree 
upon principles of fair coexistence. For Rawls, such normative principles act as a guide for 
liberal foreign policy but do not form a cosmopolitan justice in and by themselves. For instance, 
below I will explore some of the internal shortcomings of the Rawlsian account when perceived 
as a theory of international relations. Rawl’s account of international relations begins with the 
following question: what sorts of obligations do liberal societies (well ordered) have towards 
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burdened societies, if any? According to The Laws of Peoples, well ordered societies only have 
an obligation to help burdened societies meet basic needs (Rawls, The Laws of Peoples, 57). 
Here, Rawls is denying the applicability of the distributive principles of justice to global 
circumstances. Rawls justifies this denial by drawing a distinction between kinds of social 
cooperation entered by liberal societies and those adopted by independent peoples.  In the first 
case, people freely embrace some sort of a liberal doctrine to determine the proper distribution of 
the burdens and benefits of social cooperation. In the latter case, Rawls claims that the people 
have not adopted distinctively liberal principles to govern their relations. Furthermore, according 
to Rawls, one’s birth into a non-liberal society need not be morally arbitrary and therefore 
demanding justification, or still less rectification. For Rawls, people are fairly self-sufficient and 
independent, so in the absence of liberal principles, there is no need for distributive principles to 
regulate social and economic inequalities (since other societies have not adopted liberal 
principles they are not owed anything from liberal societies, individuals in other societies are 
capable of attaining their own ends, thus, they shouldn’t be forced to accept any implications set 
by a liberal society).  
For Rawls, distributive principles are “procedural rules inherent in ideal theory that apply 
continuously without an end to regulate and justify domestic inequalities, as in the case of the 
difference principle, for instance, by mandating that the greater benefits received by the better 
endowed individuals work to improve the expectations of society’s least advantaged members” 
(Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 15). Rawlsian duty of assistance has more modest goals which only 
include aiding burdened societies: to the extent they meet their basic needs and realize basic 
principles of justice. The duty of assistance helps promote a worthwhile life for all its citizens. It 
is important to note that Rawl’s duty of assistance needs to be understood in the context of non-
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ideal theory, which is only concerned with transitional justice. Basically, the goal of transitional 
justice is to highlight how to move from an unjust status quo to an ideal social order where all 
societies come to accept and follow The Law of Peoples. Well-ordered peoples have a duty to 
assist burdened societies in establishing (just) institutions as part of the project of transition, a 
project we should engage in by the natural duty of justice.  For Rawls, global distributive 
principles have the goals of attaining basic decent institutions, securing human rights and 
meeting basic needs are covered by the duty of assistance. Anything beyond this is not demanded 
by justice.  
The questions remains, why do any liberal states have any obligation on the basis of duty 
of assistance? Surely, it is not derived from a wider obligation that well-ordered people must 
protect a full range of liberal rights no matter where the individual resides.  Even if we could 
derive such a duty, it would deny respect for decent peoples’ distinctive conceptions of justice. 
In recognition of this, Rawls offers alternative reasons to help burdened societies. Rawls appeals 
to the advantages of helping burdened societies and bringing them into “society of well-ordered 
peoples” as he calls it. Rawls contemplates the notion that by helping the burdened societies; we 
would discourage bellicose behavior. Though an argument could be made in the case of outlaws, 
this analogy seems inappropriate in the case of burdened societies. In the case of burdened 
societies, due to their lack of resources, they would be unable to indulge in belligerent behaviour 
against liberal societies.  Although it may be in the interest of liberal states to help burdened 
societies for the sake of strategic self-interest, a compelling argument for such action remains to 
be seen.  
Given the failure of the previous argument in support of duty of assistance, Rawls offers 
an alternative. Rawls attempts to anchor duty of assistance within the principle of toleration. He 
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derives the duty of assistance from the political values implicit in the public culture of an 
international society of peoples. Rawls forwards this argument by suggesting that political 
liberalism’ criterion of reciprocity obliges liberal states to help burdened states meet their basic 
needs so that they can negotiate the terms of their association. If burdened societies’ needs were 
unmet, then any willingness to embrace terms of cooperation offered by liberal people could be 
dismissed as desperate, in turn as coerced acts. By honoring the duty of assistance, we make free 
consent possible. Rawls speaks to this within the context of domestic justice when he says, 
“genuine reciprocity demands that parties proposing terms of association need to reasonably 
believe that others can agree to them as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position” (Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, 57). Although, it is very appealing in theory, this alternative is burdened with problems 
as well. Once we establish a just society of peoples, it is not hard to imagine that representatives 
of burdened societies would request larger transfers than those allocated by the duty of 
assistance. It is a well-known fact that for burdened societies to narrow the gap between 
themselves and liberal nations, they will need substantial and sustained aid to allow them to enter 
into agreements as somewhat free and equal partners. It is unclear where we would draw the line.  
On one hand, Rawls is attempting to provide aid to burdened societies to help them attain 
elementary justice to join the ranks of well- ordered people.  On the other hand, we are holding 
these people responsible for the choices made by unaccountable elites. Surely, members of 
burdened states cannot be considered free by any means. And such a treatment cannot be 
considered fair. Although, in the case of liberal justice in domestic societies, Rawls insists on 
three things- the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportunity and assurances that 
inequalities benefit all persons, and especially the least advantaged-none of these are even 
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mentioned within The Law of Peoples, either among or within nations.  Ultimately, The Law of 
Peoples sheds little clarity on what sorts of institutions or background rules are required by the 
Rawlsian account. For Rawls, The Law of Peoples fails to do justice to any core liberal values, 
and simply comes off as an account lacking moral authority.   
Given that Rawls’ intentions was not to put forth the content of International law, the 
criticism that this account is inadequate is less relevant. However, the more serious criticism 
that’s holds is that Rawlsian account of tolerance undercuts accepted international human rights. 
For Rawls, the primary delivery vehicle for justice remains with the states. By arguing for the 
inclusion of decent hierarchical states within the international legal system as legitimate, Rawls 
makes two key assumptions. First, hierarchical states are legitimate because at some level they 
represent and respond to the preferences of their citizens. And second, while such societies are 
not built on liberal principles, their principles are nevertheless rational.  To argue that 
hierarchical and communal regimes are both reasonable and legitimate seems to be 
fundamentally inconsistent with key principles of liberal justice. 
  Construed as a theory of international law, perhaps, the criticism that the Rawlsian 
account is most susceptible to is that normative contemporary international law has moved 
beyond statism. Although Rawls seeks to distance his concept of peoples from what are 
traditionally known as states, however, The Law of Peoples put forth principles among 
international actors, essentially aggregates of individuals, in a sense functionally peoples and 
states are identical. But the question remains, does recognizing the normative priority of 
individual also entail asserting the universal validity of liberalism. The Rawlsian project attempts 
to tackle the problem of incommensurable universalist views, however, based on the principle of 
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rationality as an Kantian would argue, it is possible to demonstrate the invalidity of all 
universalist concepts, except those of Kantian in nature.   
In contrast, the Kantian cosmopolitan distributive theory appears to be a much better 
alternative compared to the Rawlsian duty of assistance based on the value of toleration. So why 
do Kantian global distributive principles fare better? The Kantian account possesses moral 
authority as it grounds political duties within the unrestricted workings of practical reason. Due 
to practical reason, rational persons recognize the need to resurrect institutions that protect 
equality and autonomy universally. However, when reason is not fully subjected to public 
scrutiny it can undermine the freedom of others.  The universal principle of right specifies the 
constraints imposed upon the external freedom of finite rational creatures situated in inescapable 
proximity to others. As Kant says in The Metaphysics of Morals "Any action is right if it can 
coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with universal law, or if on its maxim the 
freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal 
law" (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 230).  The universal principle of right solely focuses on 
the legality and judicially rightful character of the actions. Further, the universal principle of 
right, along with the concept of intelligible possession based on practical reason, gives rise to an 
additional postulate that persons have the right to unilaterally claim external goods, but only on 
condition that they acknowledge a reciprocal and inescapable duty to act in ways permitting 
others to acquire so as well. For Kant, persons have a duty to act towards others so that what is 
external (usable) could become someone's property. The permissive law of practical reason 
mandates the institutionalization of public right governing possession domestically and globally. 
The duty of assistance based on the principle of toleration only gives rise to narrow set of duties.  
And the permissive law of practical reason gives rise to wider obligations that strive to secure 
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conditions fostering rightful appropriation.  These obligations include renouncing interfering 
with others’ rightful appropriation and eliminating things that could hinder the realization of 
everyone’s freedom. Essentially, for Kant republican states have duties to remedy not only those 
hindrances to individuals' freedom posed by third party invasions, but also those caused due to 
disadvantageous political, social, and economic circumstances.  In The Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant prescribes: "impose taxes to support organizations providing for the poor, redistributing 
money from the wealthy to support children abandoned because of poverty or shame" (Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals, 326). Unlike Rawls, Kant’s duty across borders is based on practical 
reason by means of the fact that all persons inhabit the earth involuntary; this forms the original 
community, in which practical reason dictates that freedom and basic liberties should be 
extended to all individuals in accordance with universalizable law.  Further, he even suggests 
enacting laws allowing any person without the “personal resources requisite to independence to 
work his way up from this passive condition to an active one" (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 
315). 
Kant speaks of an original community that encompasses all persons as an idea of 
practical reason. The original community, for Kant, is a union of persons who find themselves, 
simply by virtue of their involuntary appearance on earth, inescapably in common possession of 
all. Kant elaborates: “Original possession in common is, rather, a practical rational concept 
which contains a priori the principle in accordance with which alone people can use a place on 
the earth in accordance with principles of right” (Kant, Ibid, 262). As Shaw writes, according to 
Kant, to put this idea into practice,  
“all persons need to enter into a civil society, gradually extend public relations of right to 
all persons and peoples throughout the world; and finally to organize their relations in 
ways providing other persons opportunities to achieve self-sufficiency by means of their 
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rightful appropriation, and failing this, in extremis, directly to provide for others’ basic 
needs” (Shaw, 235).   
This appears to be representative of Kant’s views, as by means practical reason it would follow 
that all individuals should have the means to attain their respective ends to realize their freedoms. 
In the absence of such a state of affairs, it is necessary to help facilitate conditions whereby 
freedom can be fully realized, and conditions of perpetual peace can be secured for all involved.  
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CONCLUSION 
Rawls attempts to put forth principles of justice that satisfy utilitarianism’s concerns for 
the greatest number without neglecting the individual.  To this end, Rawls’ theory of justice is 
constructed around the idea of the kind of a civil society a reasonable man would choose to live 
in? The Rawlsian model however quickly encounters problems when individuals have to obey 
commands when they go against his interests? The Rawlsian model is based on a contract where 
every man gives adherence to civil society only on the condition that he is guaranteed certain 
minimal rights. For Rawls, such a contract sets goals, and limits of the civil society, prescribes to 
duties for the rulers and motivates the citizens’ adherence as well as defines their legitimate 
claims. Within the Ralwsian system, there is no institutional context, to determine natural rights 
such that they can be universalized, ultimately risking collapse into what Kant calls “lawless 
freedom” or another way of describing the state of nature (as we have various subjects acting on 
their basis of their notions of justice).  
Rawls’ model for a theory of justice was shaped to accommodate for sensibilities that 
have emerged from utilitarianism and the dissatisfactions associated with it, I argue it lacks the 
moral infrastructure that the Kantian system has to offer. Rawls’ two fundamental principles 
from the original position are: firstly, that each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others, secondly, all goods are to be 
equally distributed (if unequally distributed, this unequal distribution must be agreed to be to the 
advantage of all as measured by the desires of the least advantaged member of society). In a 
sense, those that are advantaged can only use their advantages within an egalitarian society, 
where they have persuaded the disadvantaged that whatever inequalities exist, they are to their 
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advantage. Rawls’ somewhat unique contribution is to incorporate the maxim of contemporary 
social welfare into the fundamental principles of justice.  
Within the Kantian account, the subject of justice consists of agents as persons who 
reason about action and autonomy. Autonomy is a necessary precondition for exercising rights. 
For Kant, a will which acts on the practical law is a will which is acting on the idea of the form 
of law, an idea of reason which has nothing to do with the senses. The moral will is independent 
of the world of the senses, the world where it might be constrained by one's contingent desires. 
The will is therefore fundamentally free.  The only appropriate rule whose content does not 
restrict the freedom of will is the categorical imperative. To follow the practical law is to be 
autonomous, whereas to follow any of the other types of contingent laws (hypothetical 
imperatives) is to be heteronomous and therefore un-free. Ultimately, moral law expresses the 
positive content of freedom.  The Rawlsian account presupposes autonomy when he claims each 
agent has a share in the proceeds of society. But is the action an expression of a rational maxim 
that is universal adoptable by all or merely driven by preference and inclinations. Unlike the state 
of nature that Kant relies on for his theory of justice, Rawls relies on abstract hypothetical 
conditions to arrive upon his two principles. Within the state of nature, we are presented with “a 
picture of man as he is really is, divested of convention, accident and illusion, a picture grounded 
on and consistent with the new science of nature” (Bloom, 651). For Kant, man’s primary natural 
concern is to preserve himself. In recognition of this, man enters the contract of society because 
his life is threatened and he fears losing it. The fear that man feels is not an abstraction, an 
imagination, but rather an experience that compels man to not only adhere to the civil society but 
to preserve it. In contrast to this, within the original position, there is nothing that corresponds to 
any man’s real experience as the fear of death disappears. The Rawlsian system provides little 
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motive for man to join the civil society, let alone accept its rules. For instance, when the veil of 
ignorance falls away, depending on one’ position in the society, the motive for compliance also 
somewhat falls away. However, when man leaves the state of nature, the passions found there 
remain with him.  Unlike Kant, whose theory of justice took its bearings from a negative pole, 
man’s desire to avoid death, Rawls bases his theory on the positive goal of happiness.  Rawls 
seems to be working from the assumption that some sort of distribution of primary goods would 
best affect happiness. However, this can be easily disputed given people have vastly different 
visions of what is necessary for happiness. Surely, the focus should lie elsewhere. Within the 
Kantian system, the principles of freedom, equality and civil independence take centre stage, as 
these allow citizens to realize their own version of happiness.  And Kant concludes that the 
proper application of the principle of right within a republican constitution would better promote 
happiness than any other. Within a republican constitution, there is a basis for trust and security, 
essential for happiness. Such a republican constitution ensures that people don’t suffer unjustly. 
Clearly, it can be challenging to employ the Rawlsian principles even within a domestic 
context. However, does the Rawlsian account provide a useful framework for international 
relations? The answer is No. Within ‘The Law of Peoples’, Rawls argues that well-ordered 
peoples only have an obligation to help burdened societies satisfy their members' basic needs. By 
doing so, Rawls is denying the applicability of global distributive principles, more specifically, 
his own difference principle. Rawls justifies his denial on the basis of the fact that burdened 
societies have not adopted those liberal principles. Based on this, surely well-ordered societies 
do not have any obligation to protect the rights of those that reside in burdened societies. As 
such, Rawls would be denying respect for decent peoples’ distinctive conceptions of justice. 
However Rawls recognizes that we will need to maintain relations with other societies, even 
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those that are not liberal. To maintain rightful associations, Rawls argues that genuine reciprocity 
demands that parties proposing terms of association need to reasonably believe that others can 
agree to them as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the 
pressure of an inferior political or social position (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 60). But this 
argument also runs into problems; as it is ambiguous as to how far well-ordered (liberal) 
societies ought to go to ensure people within burdened societies can be considered free and 
equal.   
Kantian cosmopolitan distributive theory appears to be a more solid alternative that 
possesses greater moral authority and political potency as it grounds political duties within the 
unrestricted workings of practical reason. The Kantian original community that encompasses all 
persons is an idea of practical reason. Man finds himself inescapably in common possession with 
others; in order for man to preserve himself, he must act in accordance with principles of right. 
To fully realize this idea, Kant calls for a civil society, where public relations of rights are 
extended to all people across the world, so that their relations can be better organized to achieve 
self-sufficiency by means of rightful appropriation. And, when necessary, redistribution of 
resources is justifiable within the Kantian system if required for the preservation of mankind.  
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